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May 15, 1949

Telegram, Shtykov to Vyshinsky

Shtykov recounts a recent meeting between Kim Il and Mao Zedong.

June 7, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 3446, Filippov [Stalin] to Krasovsky, for Cde. Mao Zedong

Telegram from Stalin telling Mao that he is ready to receive Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung.

June 13, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 3557, Filippov [Stalin] to Roshchin

Telegram from Stalin to Mao summarizing his discussions with Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang on the issues of military advisors, air force training and assistance, and the implications of a potential armistice.

June 30, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 3917, Filippov [Stalin] to Krasovsky, for Cde. Mao Zedong

Telegram from Stalin to Mao advising how to reply to the American request for armistice negotiations.

April 10, 1950

Ciphered telegram, Soviet Representative Aleksei Ignatieff in Pyongyang to Vyshinsky

In a discussion between Mao Zedong and Ri Ju-yeon, Mao expresses a positive attitude toward China-North Korea relations, though indicates he is unaware that Kim Il Sung was then in the Soviet Union.

July 8, 1950

Ciphered Telegram No. 3231, Filippov [Stalin] to Soviet Ambassador Roshchin

Telegram from Stalin to Beijing advising that they send a representative to Korea.

July 13, 1950

Ciphered telegram, Filippov [Stalin] to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)

Telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou Enlai detailing his response to the English protest concerning "the Korean question." Also, a request for confirmation of Chinese troop movements to the Sino-Korea border, in case of a repulse of North Korean forces. Finally, a confirmation of the plans to train Chinese pilots on Soviet jets, to be followed by the transfer of the jets to Chinese possession.

November 21, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 26044, Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.