Imre Nagy reports that Soviet troops plan to enter Romania, and contacts Gheorghiu-Dej for advice on how to proceed.

Tito, currently in Brioni, requests that a meeting with Khrushchev and Malenkov is relocated to Brioni, as Tito is forbidden to leave due to illness.

Khrushchev and members of the CPSU CC Presidium decide to not withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary. Negotiations with Tito and the situation in Yugoslavia are also mentioned.

Sverdlov provides a brief overview of agent "Volodya" (Imre Nagy) and his work.

Matusov and Altman report on Nagy's arrest on 4/5 March 1938 and subsequent release on 8 March, and describe some of his work.

Certificate signed by Imre Nagy upon enlistment in the OGPU secret police (later the NKVD).

KGB Chief Serov details the violence and resistance in Hungary. He writes that armed groups are executing communists and are actively planning to seek out and kill employees of the state security organs. Serov expresses concern over the dismissal of state employees and the decision by other state employees to leave work.

This resolution instructs the Soviet Ambassador to Belgrade to transmit a letter to Tito requesting a secret meeting on November 1 or 2 with Khrushchev and Malenkov. It also empowers certain members to conduct negotiations with the United Workers Party of Poland.

Tugarinov wrote this overview of reactions to the events in Hungary and Suez by third world nations. Tugarinov reports that the events in Hungary and the Near East increased the prestige of the United States.

In this letter, the Central Committee of Yugoslavia responds to the CC CPSU over questions concerning Yugoslavia’s decision to provide shelter to Nagy and his group at their embassy. The letter begins by expressing agreement on the weakness of Nagy’s government, the need to form a new government under Kadar, and the existence of “honest communists” in Nagy’s government that could assist Kadar. The letter relates that Yugoslavia cannot hand Nagy and his group over to authorities because of the domestic consequences of such an action. The correspondence ends with both the suggestion of amnesty for Nagy and Yugoslavia’s disavowal of any connection to Nagy or the uprising.