Khrushchev defends Enver Hoxha against personal attacks from Josip Broz Tito, but emphasizes cooperation between Yugoslavia and socialist camp. Khrushchev also suggests that Albania is a potential foothold for the spread of socialism to Asian, African, and Middle Eastern countries, and calls for "ideological war" in order to spread influence to these areas.

Hoxha complains to Khrushchev about Yugoslavia's conduct toward Albania. While Khrushchev says that the Soviet Union will back Albania, he complains about Hoxha's personal demeanor and emotional complaints about Yugoslavia. Khrushchev also criticizes Albania's decision to execute a woman, and a Yugoslav national.

The meeting was among leaders from China, Vietnam, North Korea and Albania in 1964. They discussed Soviet-Romanian relations and plans to support Romania.

The Soviet leadership discusses the state of Soviet foreign policy after the Hungarian crisis and Khrushchev’s visit to the US. Molotov criticizes Khrushchev for recklessness in foreign policy direction. Soviet inroads in the Middle East and the Third World are analyzed. The effects of the crises in Eastern Europe are placed in the context of the struggle against US imperialism.

The conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade was organized when Indonesia and other countries of Asia and Africa were attempting to organize a Second Bandung Conference. Tito and Nehru, trying to minimize the influence of China in the Asian and African countries, initiated a conference that they called the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade. The document discusses the 24 participating countries, the agenda, the proceedings, the different groups among the delegation and the two main documents that the conference adopted: the manifesto and the declaration. The manifesto, titled “The Danger from the War and the Call for Peace,” according to the Albanian ambassador, was adopted in a revisionist spirit, calling on Khrushchev and Kennedy to maintain peace. Meanwhile, the declaration criticized colonialism and imperialism. The Belgrade conference did not decide on any specific issues and did not reach any important conclusions. In Albania, a week after the conference, the journal “Zeri i Popullit” (Voice of the People) wrote an article in which it identified Tito as an agent of imperialism and stated that Yugoslavia was not an non-aligned country as it participated in the Balkan Pact.

These notes (part of the Malin Collection) describe Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s decision to negotiate with Yugoslavia regarding the fate of Imre Nagy after his arrest and transfer to Romania. The notes state that negotiations are inadvisable and remain the responsibility of Hungary. A second section of the document refers to instructions to the KGB for discrediting Nagy.

Khrushchev reports on his conversations with Tito and other Yugoslav leaders during his visit to Yugolsavia. The first conversation addressed the bread shortage in Yugoslavia, a trade agreement between the two countries and the structure of Yugoslav agriculture. The second conversation addressed Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the issues of building socialism, the international press, Marxist-Leninist policy, and Yugoslav relations with other European socialist countries.

Khrushchev describes his conversations with Josip Broz Tito regarding Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The leaders discussed Yugoslavia's need for economic and technological assistance from the Soviet Union; socialist methods and ideology; alignment on international issues; and amnesty for Communist fugitives returning to Yugoslavia. Khrushchev expresses concern about the behavior of Yugoslav diplomats and the Yugoslav press. He recommends to the CPSU CC that increasing contact with Yugoslav leaders will facilitate rapprochement between the Parties.

Letter from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev to Yugoslav leader Josep B. Tito suggesting that the time is ripe for a rapprochement between the two states and parties. Blaming former NKVD chief Lavrenty Beria and former Yugoslav leadership member Milovan Djilas for doing the work of the imperialists by attempting to drive a wedge between the Soviet and Yugoslav people and parties, Khrushchev suggests that the ousting of both will increase rapprochement between the two countries and be the catalyst for a a summit between the two leaders.

Yugoslav response to Soviet approaches about normalizing relations between the two countries and the two parties. While encouraged by the Soviet gestures, the Yugoslav leadership remains cautious and suggests that the rapprochement take a slow and steady course, taking into account the differences as well as the similarities between the two countries.