A memorandum for President Nixon from National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger on the current status of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" or Eastern Policy, which sought to normalize relations between West Germany and the communist countries.

Ambassador Pervukhin sends the views of the Soviet embassy in East Germany regarding the negotiation of a peace treaty between East Germany and the Soviet Union. It notes that "the most difficult issues which will arise after signing a peace treaty are the practical exercise by [the] GDR organs of effective control over the links between West Berlin and the FRG and the establishment of a regime over the movement of the population between West and Democratic Berlin."

Ambassador Pervukhin reports to Russian Foreign Minister Gromyko on the position of the East German government regarding the possibility of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and East Germany and a resolution to the ambiguous status of Berlin. The report also discusses the possibility of enforcing better border controls between east and west Berlin in order to "close 'the door to the West.'"

An analysis written by the GDR's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the respective positions of European socialist states, socialist states in general, and NATO and other capitalist European states, on the organization of a European security conference, as well as guidance for carrying out the CSCE negotiations based upon an analysis of each side's perceived strengths and weaknesses

In March 1953, Moscow had declined Ulbricht’s request for tightening up the sector border in Berlin, then the major loophole in the SED leadership’s efforts to seal off East Germany. In the aftermath of the demonstrations and unrest in Berlin, the SED leadership apparently tried to reintroduce the idea of increased “border security” in Berlin. Eager to salvage whatever was left of its political position as a champion of German unity, Moscow again held such measures as politically “disadvantageous” and “unacceptable.” Certainly, the Kremlin was also aware of the continued widespread resentment among the Berlin and GDR population which made any more restrictive measures a risky undertaking. Instead, the Soviets urged the SED to increase its “fight against hostile elements” in West Berlin—an issue that would become more and more the focus of Soviet attitude on Berlin.

Draft instructions of the Soviet leadership to its representatives in East Germany, advising that the SED requests for East German control of the border with West Germany are "unacceptable and grossly simplistic."

SED CC Politburo requests to resume movement across the sector border between East and West Berlin. This report includes step-by-step instructions in how this could be implemented.

The large-scale migration of GDR’s population to West Germany is becoming a major issue in Germany. The SCC in Germany, the SED, and GDR government discuss and outline measures for preventing this defection in the future.

Conant suggests that while US policy towards East Germany should, on principle, encourage the “spirit of resistance” brought about by the East German Uprising, it is believed that Communist authorities will continue to use brutal tactics to restrain such resistance, and therefore US initiatives towards the situation should be restrained as to not provide East German authorities an opportunity for more brutal repressions of the population.

Sergei Dengin states that a series of strikes are occurring in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, following the East German Uprising. It is reported that GDR inhabitants are generally dissatisfied with the under allocation of food products, steel, electricity, and other resources. Jendretzky has agreed to take measures to improve the supply of resources, strengthen government authority, and control the spread of provocative rumors.