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August 25, 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Croatia’s President Tudjman on 25 August 1995 at 09.20 hours

Kohl emphasizes the need for a peaceful liberation of Eastern Croatia. Kohl urgently asks Tudjman to look into Croatian war crimes and human rights violations himself. Kohl wants Tudjman "to enforce discipline in the cases where the allegations were justified and penalize the people that had committed crimes."

August 18, 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major on 18 August 1995, 13.00 hours

Kohl and Major discuss the impact of the war in former Yugoslavia on the Muslim world, the European Community and domestic U.S. policy. Both agree that there was a window of opportunity for a settlement before the winter.

July 18, 1995

Memorandum: Situation in former Yugoslavia, here: The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Major on 17 July 1995

Kohl and Major discuss the situation in former Yugoslavia and the need to draw a red line to stop Serbian attacks in the Bosnian war. Both emphasize a potential change in NATO's posture moving from a a peace keeping operation toward a peace enforcing position entailing the possibility of full-fledged war against the Bosnian Serbs.

November 27, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic on Thursday, 26 November 1992

Kohl and Panic review the situation in Yugoslavia and Panic's standing in the domestic struggle with Milosevic. Panic emphasizes his readiness to recognize Slovenia and Croatia reiterating that a democratic Yugoslavia could be a catalyst for peace in the entire region. Kohl remains doubtful arguing that Milosevic would not support such a policy.

June 30, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with French President Mitterrand over Breakfast on Saturday, 27 June 1992

Mitterrand emphasizes that Yugoslavia could turn into "a second Vietnam” in case of a Western military intervention.  He questions the rational of U.S. and British policy in the Balkans and rejects France's military involvement. Kohl rules out Germany's participation in military operations.

December 9, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on Thursday, 6 December 1991

Kohl and Tudman examine the situation in the Yugoslavia War and the state of EC sanctions against Yugoslavia. They discuss Germany's forthcoming recognition of Croatia. In addition, they review the correlation of military forces between Croatia and the Yugoslavian People's Army. 

October 9, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the President of Slovenia, Milan Kucan, on Tuesday, 8 October 1991

Kohl and Kucan discuss the disintegration of Yugoslavia and emphasize the need for minority rights, self determination and the non-use of force. Kohl explains his position arguing that Germany must not be "singularized" in its diplomacy.

October 8, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Croatian Foreign Minister Separovic on Monday, 7 October 1991

Kohl and Separovic examine the situation in Croatia against the backdrop of the fact that the Yugoslavian People's Army was just 30km away from Zagreb. Separovic asks for assistance and international recognition. 

October 9, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversations with Italian Prime Minister Andreotti, October 4, 7, and 8, 1991

Kohl and Andreotti elaborate on the timing of Slovenia's and Croatia's recognition. Due to the lack of consensus on this within the EC, they agree to go ahead with a group of five or six countries recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Both emphasize the need to avoid a repetition of the 1941 World War II coalition in this regard.

September 20, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales, Thursday, 19 September 1991, 11:20 until 12:46 hours

Kohl and Gonzalez discuss the potential for European integration after Germany's unification and the urge for fast action after the coup in Moscow. They review the ensuing war in Yugoslavia and the need for the Federal Republic to avoid going it alone in its efforts for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.

Pagination