1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
-
North America
1922- 2004
February 4, 1992
Kohl and Kravchuk discuss Ukraine-Russia relations and problems within the newly established Commonwealth of Independent States. They review the prospects for the dismantlement of nuclear and chemical weapons in Ukraine.
November 25, 1991
Kohl and Yeltsin discuss Russia-Ukraine relations, Russian debt and finance issues, the question of Volga-Germans and the release of Honecker from the Chilean embassy.
June 28, 1990
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 28 June 1990 describes the latest developments in Liberia, the Soviet Union, Israel, Japan, France, Italy and Taiwan.
July 28, 1990
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 28 July 1990 describes the latest developments in Persian Gulf, Liberia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Poland, Papua New Guinea, China, Zaire, OPEC, Haiti and South Africa.
October 2, 1990
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 2 October 1990 describes the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, Yugoslavia, Angola, the Soviet Union, Liberia and Thailand.
January 30, 1990
An analysis of movements for autonomy in Moldavia and growing concern in Moscow.
December 23, 1989
An analysis of the National Salvation Front and their decisions to reform Romania.
February 22, 1991
Romanian officials are once again raising the issue of the unification of Moldova and Romania.
November 28, 1989
In response to the increase of anti-Soviet and Romanian nationalist propaganda, the Moldavian KGB decides to form a new organization, Section 3, "to provide a principled basis for the activity concerning the defense of the Soviet constitutional regime." Detailed instructions are given for the new Sections operations and activities.
July 24, 1989
Report by the Moldavian KGB on the decisions it had implemented of the USSR KGB Collegium from the previous year. Includes work to counter Romanian nationalist propaganda. Romania is referred to by the code name "Objective 24." General-Lieutenant G.M. Volkov, the Chairman of the Moldavian SSR KGB, maintained that an all-out offensive was required, including the use of “persons of trust from among the ranks of people of science, culture and art,” in order to neutralize “the subversive activity of the adversary” by identifying and isolating the “emissaries of the adversary” and imposing “permanent and reliable operational control” over them.
