January 26, 1948
Letter from Assen Georgiev to Bulgarian Foreign Minister V. Kolarov on Bulgarian Intelligence Activity in France
The head of the Bulgarian legation in Paris Asen Georgiev shares his observations for the inefficiencies in the Bulgarian intelligence apparatus. He recommends a number of measures that will potentially improve the intelligence operations abroad. As a first step he suggests sweeping personnel changes.
May 10, 1955
Report from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Comments on the Asian-African Conference from Capitalist Ruled Countries After the Asian-African Conference'
The Chinese Foreign Ministry summarizes (predominantly) Western leaders' statements about the Bandung Conference. Secretary Dulles expressed great satisfaction with the "useful and good conference," especially its role in "checking China," while Great Britain expressed strong disapproval of China's behavior at the conference and France was "shocked" that Algeria was discussed. Israel and Australia expressed regret that they were excluded from the conference.
May 25, 1957
Collection of Reports from Polish Military Attaches Around the World
Reports from Washington, Ottawa, Cairo, Berlin, Brussells, Rome, Stockholm, and Helsinki discussing events that occurred from January-May 1957. Most of the contents revolved around meetings with other foreign officials and actions of embassy's host country.
May 26, 1959
Note about a Conversation between the DPRK Ambassador in Berlin Comrade Pak Il-yeong and Comrades Kohrt and Demel on 26 May 1959 at 1500 hours
Discussion on organizational problems with South Korean students in western countries, who intend to live in North Korea, and about German reunifcation.
January 31, 1962
Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'
Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”
June 05, 1963
Research Memorandum REU-44 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Evidence of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction in European NATO Countries with the Lack of a Share in Ownership or Control of Nuclear Weapons'
Ambassador Livingston Merchant, who was responsible for the U.S. diplomatic effort to win support for the MLF, asked INR to report on the degree to which non-nuclear European members of NATO were satisfied with their “lack of a share in ownership or control of nuclear weapons.” Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force.
January 20, 1966
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'
This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.
May 24, 1972
Memorandum by Chief of Defense Staff, 'Political-military considerations with regards to the ministerial meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee' (DPC), Bruxelles
The document discusses the weak state of European defence in light of the threat posed by Warsaw Pact that continues to increase its capabilities. It underlines the minimal participation and marginal role of Italy in the alliance, demanding a more meaningful financial and military contribution.
May 24, 1972
[Report on Warsaw Pact] Presentation about the information (intelligence) concerning Warsaw Pact's military potential, explained at the meeting of NATO Defence Planning Committee (Bruxelles, 24th May 1972)
This rather technical document compares the strategic capabilities (conventional and nuclear) of Warsaw Pact and NATO. The document notes that Warsaw Pact has considerably increased its capabilities catching up with the West, and raises the question about Soviet intentions, and whether continuing armament is in line with peaceful coexistence.
July 06, 1972
General Staff of Defense (SMD) Summary Report about the meeting of NATO Defence Planning Committee at the ministerial session (Bruxelles, May 24th 1972)
Summary of the DPC meeting in Brussels where the alliance members discussed potential responses to the increasing and modernizing capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. Although US Secretary of Defense Laird highlights US commitment to its allies, Italy and other NATO members should not resort to "optimism of convenience", but fully commit to common defense.
March 15, 1973
Cable from Dutch Embassy in Brussels to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'North Korea'
Van Schelle reports that pending the outcome of an investigation the Belgian government has told its Embassy in Warsaw to avoid further contacts with the North Koreans. Furthermore the Belgian Embassy in Bern will look into a presumable visit to Switzerland by a highly placed North Korean and possible motivation of the Swiss to establish a North Korean trade office. The Belgians have reiterated their restrictive standpoint and have no current intention to recognize North Korea
April 30, 1974
Report, 'NATO Conference on intelligence (AHIWG) for the review of the documents MC 161/73 and 255/73 (Bruxelles, 25th March-5th April)'
Report from NATO's Intelligence Conference (AHIWG) where member states reviewed and updated two key intelligence documents: "Strength and Capabilities of the Soviet bloc" (MC 161/73) and "Warsaw Pact Penetration and Military Presence in the Middle East, North Africa and adjacent areas" (MC 255/73).
Task for the Operational Command Staff Exercise Soyuz-75 for the 4th Army
This document outlines the politico-military situation in advance of a 17-25 March 1975 operational command staff exercise. The exercise scenario begins with a conventional offensive initiated by the 'Westerners' at 0600 on 17 March which escalated to a theater nuclear war by 19 March. This briefing document for exercise participants describes the military situation as of the morning of 19 March, including the tactical information on the geographic disposition, activities, and status of Warsaw Pact and 'Western' forces, air defense, communications, electronic warfare, and the situation in the rear. Appendices (included as a .pdf) contain detailed information on: The order of battle of the troops of the 4th Army, The availability of nuclear warheads and surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] in the 4th Army, Information about the nuclear strikes of the "Westerners," Information about the nuclear strikes by the "Easterners" on troops and objectives in the "Westerners" rear, Information about the engineer troops of the 4th Army, Information about the chemical troops of the 4th Army, Information about the signal troops of the 4th Army, Information about the rear of the 4th Army, The order of battle and the identified numbering of the formations and units of the "Westerners."
June 11, 1976
George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'
This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.
May 03, 1977
State Department telegram to U.S. Embassy London et al., 'Nuclear Suppliers Meeting, April 28-29, 1977'
This document describes the meeting of 15 nuclear supplier states in London where issues were discussed such as full-scope safeguards, including sanctions in the guidelines, purpose of supplier consent, moratoriums, enlargement of membership, and various countries' individual concerns were voiced and addressed.
November 04, 1978
'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' Department of State cable 281962 to US Embassy United Kingdom et al.
U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."