Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • June 25, 1971

    Minutes of the Romanian Politburo Meeting Concerning Nicolae Ceauşescu's Visit to China, North Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam

    These are the minutes of a meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party discussing Romanian leader Nicolae Ceauşescu's 1971 visit to China. Ceauşescu reports on his visits to Chinese enterprises, universities, and laboratories, and acknowledges the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. The report on China is followed by comments on his subsequent visits to North Korea, Vietnam, and Mongolia. Finally, the discussion turns to Moscow's criticism of Ceauşescu's anti-Soviet statements during his stay in the Middle East.

  • June, 2007

    Heat Haze. Folder 20. The Chekist Anthology

    Mitrokhin notes that beginning in December 1970 and during the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the KGB had the following objective: to enhance intelligence and counter-intelligence activities of the Cheka. To achieve this purpose, the KGB established a strategic unit consisting of heads of directorates, deputy secretaries, and other leading committee members chaired by Lieutenant General S.K. Tsvigun. Particular attention was given to signs of terrorist intentions. The unit counteracted eight anti-Soviet groups and organizations, including the Revolutionary Party of Intellectuals (Sverdlovsk), Russian Workers’ Party (Rostov-na-Donu), Struggle for Personal Freedom Union (Temirtau), Struggle for Liberation of Armenia Union (Yerevan), a group of Zionists, and others. Security level was elevated for entry into Moscow, monitoring of important targets, and conducting street patrols. On Red Square, 67 people harboring anti-Soviet views were detained, and four attempted suicides by burning were prevented.

  • June, 2007

    Signs of Anti-Sovietism, 1972. Folder 21. The Chekist Anthology

    On December 25, 1972 Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council granted the KGB authority to issue official warnings. The goal of the warnings was to prevent activities that threatened national security. Mitrokhin’s notes demonstrate that they were not intended as a punishment or penalty. The order of the Presidium provided for the use of the official warnings as a preventative measure.