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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • March 30, 1978

    Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK, Telegram, 30 March 1978. Subject: DPRK-Pakistani relations.

    The Pakistani ambassador informs the Hungarian Embassy in the DPRK that Zia ul-Haq will pay a visit to Pyongyang soon.

  • April 30, 1980

    Ciphered Telegram No. 68, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Short analysis of Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq's upcoming visits to China and North Korea, with discussion of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan's nuclear program.

  • March 23, 1981

    Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan and the US: Seeking Ways to Improve Relations'

    A State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research report on the desire of the Pakistani leadership to improve relations with the U.S. and negotiate a more substantial aid package. The report warns against becoming too close to General Zia, as close relations with him “might harm future relations” should he be swept from power.

  • July 05, 1982

    US Embassy Pakistan Cable 10239 to State Department, 'My First Meeting with President Zia'

    A report to the State Department from Ambassador General Vernon Walters on his meeting with President Zia, where he confronted the Pakistani President with “incontrovertible evidence” that his country had “transferred designs and specifications for nuclear weapons components to purchasing agents in several countries for the purpose of having these nuclear weapons components fabricated for Pakistan” despite promises not to do so. Zia denied the charge, and Walter later commented, “either he really does not know or is the most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met.”

  • July 06, 1982

    US Embassy Pakistan Cable 10276 to State Department, 'My Final Meeting with President Zia'

    After Ambassador General Vernon Walters’ second day meeting with President Zia, the Pakistani leader verbally acknowledged U.S. evidence that Pakistan sought nuclear weapons components from abroad despite promises not to do so. However, Zia refused to put this in writing, and in a letter to President Reagan claimed the U.S. intelligence was a “total fabrication,” likely in an effort to save face.

  • October 17, 1982

    US Embassy Pakistan Cable 15696 to State Department, 'Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Meeting with General Zia'

    The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan reports to the State Department on a meeting between Ambassador General Vernon Walters and President Zia. Walters returned to Islamabad to warn Pakistani officials that U.S. aid was in “grave jeopardy” after a link between the Pakistani program and Chinese technology was discovered. A U.S. military aid package, which included F-16 fighter-bombers, was also discussed.

  • November 08, 1982

    'Pakistan-US: Demarche on F-16 Equipment,' 11/8/82, with Memo from McMahon to Carlucci, 'Risk Assessment of the Sale of AN/ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan,'1 1/8/82, and Excerpt from Natl Intel Est on Pakistan

    With delivery of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers imminent, Pakistan threatens to refuse delivery unless the U.S. agrees to include the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. CIA analysts have concerns that including this sensitive radar technology in the delivery of the F-16s would enable China, a close military ally of Pakistan, to obtain and study the device.

  • November 19, 1982

    Henry S. Rowen, National Intelligence Council, to DDCI [Deputy Director of Central Intelligence McMahon], 19 November 1982, with attached memorandum from National Intelligence Council staffer [name excised], 'Pakistan'

    Despite the concerns about sharing the ALR-69 radar warning receiver with Pakistan for fear of it falling into Chinese hands, CIA officials argue that failure to meet Pakistani demands would lead to a “serious blow to U.S. worldwide nonproliferation efforts.”

  • June 16, 1986

    Kenneth Adelman, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 'Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Programs and US Security Assistance'

    A letter from the United States Control and Disarmament Agency assessing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and US security assistance. Three main issues and possible courses of actions are discussed; they include President Reagan’s “red lines,” certification of Pakistani nuclear activity and convincing Congress to continue aid to Pakistan after September 1987.