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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • April 29, 1964

    Letter from Alan C. Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office to Arthur R. H. Kellas, British Embassy

    In a letter to Arthur Kellas, counselor at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, Alan Goodison of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department disclosed the Argentine-Israel uranium deal, which involved the transfer of 80-100 tons over 33 months. Since evidence suggested that Israel had facilities for plutonium separation, they estimated that there would be enough plutonium for a weapon within 20 months; however, Goodison had no proof that the Israelis planned to produce a nuclear weapon, only that they had the capability to do so. Minutes are attached.

  • June 04, 1964

    Letter from Christopher Audland, British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to Alan Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office

    Christopher Audland, a political officer at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, learned from the Canadian Charge d'Affaires that the information on the Argentine-Israel uranium deal "did not originate in Buenos Aires," and that the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission had made previous uranium sales to West Germany and to Israel in 1962. Minutes are attached.

  • June 11, 1964

    Letter from Peter Ramsbotham, British Embassy in Paris, to William 'Willie' Morris, Foreign Office

    This letter describes a meeting between Peter Ramsbotham, chief of the chancery at the British Embassy in France, and George Soutou, a senior official at the French Foreign Ministry. Soutou acknowledged that the French believed that the Israelis were attempting to "put themselves in a position to make a nuclear bomb if they wanted to." The French-Israeli agreement did not include a condition that prevented the use of non-French uranium for Dimona, and Ramsbotham wondered whether the French should be told about the Argentine-Israeli secret deal. Minutes of a conversation with Arkell of the Defense Intelligence Staff are attached.

  • June 22, 1964

    Letter from Alan C. Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, to C. J. Audland, British Embassy in Buenos Aires

    Noting some inaccuracy in the Canadian Defence Research Board report---Argentina could not have offered to sell its “entire production” of uranium if it was also selling concentrate to Germany and trying to sell it to Japan—Goodison, of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department, asked Audland, a political officer at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to “keep your ears to the ground” to find the “exact quantities” involved.

  • June 22, 1964

    Letter from R. J. T. McLaren, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, to A. M. Warburton, British Embassy Bonn.

    McLaren wonders why the West Germans want safeguard-free uranium from the Argentine government, noting that it could be re-exported to Israel. He also confirms that information about the Argentine-Israeli deal had been passed to the Americans.

  • July 01, 1964

    Letter from D. Arkell, Defense Intelligence Staff, to R. J. T. McLaren, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office

    According to D. Arkell of the Defence Intelligence Staff, Canadian intelligence was now doubtful about the reliability of their reports on the Argentine-Israeli uranium sale.

  • July 06, 1964

    Letter from Arthur R. H. Kellas, British Embassy in Tel Aviv, to Alan C. Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office

    In response to Alan Goodison's April 29 letter, which referred to evidence for an Israeli plutonium separation facility, Arthur Kellas, counselor to the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, states that the British Embassy had “not seen such evidence [for a separation facility] and should be grateful to know what it is."

  • August 21, 1964

    Letter from Alan C. Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, to C. J. Audland, British Embassy in Buenos Aires

    Alan Goodison reported that U.S. officials were skeptical of the Canadian report because their sources had no information about an Argentine-Israeli deal and Argentine exports to Israel had not been reported in the Official Bulletin.

  • August 26, 1964

    Letter from R. C. Treweeks, Defense Intelligence Staff, to Alan C. Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office

    Referring to Goodison and Kellas' correspondence, Treweeks states that evidence shows that the Canadian report concerning an Argentine-Israeli uranium deal was incorrect and that there is little evidence for an Israeli plutonium separation facility.

  • October 06, 1964

    Letter from D. Arkell, Defense Intelligence Staff, to Alan C. Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office

    In this letter, which summarizes and agrees with the US assessment of the Argentine-Israeli deal, Arkell asks for Goodison's opinion and whether he knows of any safeguards arrangements between Israel and Argentina.

  • October 08, 1964

    Report, Canadian Defence Research Board, 'Possible Israeli Military Nuclear Program'

    After analyzing photographs taken of the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona, J. Koop, a career intelligence analyst at Canada's Defence Research Board, concluded in March 1964 that Dimona had all of the "prerequisites for commencing a modest nuclear weapons development project." When the Dimona reactor went critical, it could produce enough plutonium for at least one implosion device by the end of 1965 and increase its operating level to produce one to two per year by 1966. Arthur Kellas, a British diplomat in Israel, wrote in his forwarding letter that they were highly impressed by the analysis.

  • December 08, 1964

    Letter from R. C. Treweeks, Defense Intelligence Staff, to Alan C. Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office

    In his letter to Goodison, Treweeks declares that the Defense Intelligence Staff agreed with J. Koop's conclusion that Dimona was capable of pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Goodison's previous letter to Treweeks is attached.

  • December 22, 1964

    Letter from Alan C. Goodison, Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, to A. R. H. Kellas, British Embassy in Tel Aviv

    After consulting the Defense Intelligence Staff, Goodison writes to Kellas that "we must now accept the end of 1968 as the earliest possible date" for an Israeli nuclear bomb. As the Canadian report suggested an Israeli test by 1966, either 1968 was a typo or the Defense Intelligence Staff provided more detailed comments than are available in the file.

  • March 16, 1967

    Letter from Canadian Embassy, British Interests Section, W. H. G. Fletcher to P. A. Rhodes of the Foreign Office

    Third Secretary of the Romanian Embassy reports that Romania is eager to "widen their horizons" and “are now anxious to contact us and probably other western missions.”

  • May 11, 1967

    Letter from British Embassy in Bucharest, R. Hanbury Tension to P. A. Rhodes, Foreign Office

    Tension reports on friendly overtures by Romanian diplomatic officers.

  • November 28, 1967

    Letter from J.L. Stevenson to A.C. Stuart, 'East German Statements on Bonn-Pretoria Alliance'

    J. L. Stevenson concludes that recent East German statements about West German/South African military cooperation, including in nuclear energy, are baseless and that the recent cooperation appears benign.

  • July 15, 1969

    German Nuclear Work

    Correspondence regarding French diplomatic reporting that West Germany was developing nuclear weapons capability. H.T. Morgan concludes that the French claims are baseless and an example of "flesh creeping" activities to discourage the United Kingdom from nuclear collaboration with West Germany

  • June 06, 1972

    Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Diplomatic Report No. 367/72, 'Romania, Israel and the Arabs'

    Since the Six-Day War, Romania has been the only communist state in diplomatic relations with Israel.

  • January 05, 1975

    Telegram from the UK Embassy, Blantyre, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

  • May 10, 1977

    Letter from Roger Barltrop of British Embassy in Addis Ababa, 'The Derg'

    Information obtained by the British from an Ethiopian officer who defected to West Germany. His report shows the strong influence of the Soviet Union in the Derg at the time.