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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • July 21, 1953

    Intelligence Advisory Committee, Special Estimate (SE-47), 'Probable Effect Of Recent Developments In Eastern Germany On Soviet Policy With Respect To Germany'

    This intelligence report presents and analyzes Soviet policy in East Germany before, during, and after the East German Uprising. The report assesses potential actions the Soviets could take in the future towards East Germany, and the likelihood of each.

  • August 07, 1953

    CIA Information Report, 'Unrest over Food Packages'

    This CIA report contains information regarding disturbances in various East German cities, beginning on 2 August, 1953.

  • September 10, 1953

    CIA Information Report, 'Aftermath of the Riots'

    A CIA report presents information about the aftermath of the East German Uprising and known plans and actions taken by the SED in terms of arrests and reconstruction efforts.

  • October 16, 1953

    CIA Information Report, 'Estimated Damage as a Result of the June 16/17 Mass Demonstrations'

    A CIA report presents an assessment of the damages and monetary value of the damages following the East German Uprising, estimated by East German governmental offices.

  • January 19, 1954

    Central Intelligence Agency, NIE 12.4-54, Probable Developments in Eastern Germany Through 1955

    Estimating the current situation and probable developments in East Germany through 1955.

  • April 05, 1956

    From the Journal of Ambassador P. F. Yudin, Record of Conversation with Mao Zedong, 31 March 1956

    Soviet Ambassador Yudin discusses the 20th Congress of the CPSU with Mao, including Khrushchev's "secret speech" denouncing Stalin and his cult of personality. Mao had already seen a copy and discusses mistakes in Stalin's policy towards China at length.

  • September 04, 1958

    Anastas Mikoyan’s Recollections of his Trip to China

    Anastas Mikoyan gives a very detailed summary of his trip to China, to secretly hold talks with Mao Zedong. Begins with a summary of his trip, and choice of delegation members, and his living conditions while visiting with Mao. Describes talks with Mao, which covered a large range of topics, including Mao's divergence of opinion on American imperialism as compared to Stalin's, the CCP's lack of influence in China's cities, and Stalin's advice to arrest two Americans, including Sidney Rittenberg, who were "obvious American spies." Mao does not agree, eventually arrests spy suspects, and Mikoyan notes that after Stalin's death, USSR admitted to having no rationale or evidence for the spy allegations.

  • May 24, 1962

    Untitled Notes on the Back of the 24 May 1962 Memorandum from the General Staff to Khrushchev

    Notes from meeting of the Presidium during which Soviet leadership decides to send a commission to Cuba and chooses those who go.

  • October 05, 1962

    Malinovsky Report on Special Ammunition for Operation Anadyr

    The Defense Minister's report to Khrushchev about the progress of shipping of Soviet armaments to Cuba specifically states that Aleksandrovsk was fully loaded and ready to sail.

  • October 22, 1962

    Carlos Lechuga, Record of contacts at the UN Cuban Ambassador

    Carlos Lechuga's record of contacts of the UN Cuban Ambassador from 22 October 1962 to 11 January 1963.

  • October 23, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev

    A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.

  • October 24, 1962

    Record of Meeting of Fidel Castro and Military Chiefs

    Fidel Castro and his military advisors are discussing possible American mobilization of troops to Cuba (in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis) and what Cuba would need to do to defend itself from such an invasion. A majority of the conversation is devoted to anti-aircraft and aviation preparations.

  • October 27, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev

    A telegram dispatched from the Soviet embassy in Havana early on the morning of Saturday, 27 October 1962. Fidel Castro was at the embassy and composing an important "personal" message for Nikita Khrushchev. The alarmed Cuban leader anticipated US invasion in the next "24-72 hours."

  • November 10, 1962

    Cable from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Amb. Carlos M. Lechuga), New York

    Cuban Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, sends a cable to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN discussing the "Yankee government" inspecting Soviet ships and instructing the Mission to await further instructions on the Brazil project.

  • November 11, 1962

    Cables from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Lechuga), New York

    A series of cables from the Cuban Foreign Minister, Roa, to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN. They discuss: a Cuban amendment to the Brazil proposal; U Thant’s idea of independent declaration in which each country would promise to uphold its corresponding part of the protocol; and opposition to inspections.

  • November 11, 1962

    Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan

    This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

  • November 13, 1962

    Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, Havana

    The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.

  • November 16, 1962

    Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, Havana, 16 November 1962

    The conversation takes place soon after the IL-28 crisis, which gives Mikoyan a chance to patch up the relationship with trade agreements and promises of future aid and industrial cooperation. Near the end of the conversation, Guevara and Mikoyan discuss the theory of revolutionary struggle. Guevara shares his vision that “further development of the revolutions in Latin America must follow the line of simultaneous explosions in all countries.” Mikoyan cautions him, pointing to the Soviet experience and using the metaphor of the rebellion on the battleship “Potemkin.” Hinting at further disagreement ahead, he gently registers his disagreement with the Cuban leader’s drive to ignite revolution in the hemisphere.

  • November 20, 1962

    Cable from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Lechuga), New York

    Instructions from Cuba's Foreign Minister, Roa, to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN on how they should handle presenting the Cuban points to the Brazilian proposal as amendments.

  • November 25, 1962

    Letter from Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos to Fidel Castro re Conversation with Anastas Mikoyan

    A letter from Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos regarding a conversation he had with Anastas Mikoyan. The two discussed mostly the USSR's position on Cuba, to which Mikoyan expressed the USSR's support of Cuba (that it would retaliate if Cuba were attacked), but that peaceful coexistence was still the Soviet's plan to follow for the development of humanity toward socialism and the defeat of imperialism.