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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • September 20, 1968

    MAE Memo on Italian Initiative to review IAEA Statute

    MAE Memo on Italian initiative for securing the revision of art. 6 of the IAEA Statute in order to allow Italy's permanent inclusion, as a civil nuclear power, in the Board of Governors.

  • September 20, 1968

    MAE Memo on Non-nuclear Countries Conference

    Memo by MAE DAP on Non-nuclear countries conference held in Geneva. The paper addresses Italy's aims and discusses the need to deal with the potentially adverse impact of the NPT.

  • November 27, 1968

    Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Prospects for the Nonproliferation Treaty'

    According to this CIA evaluation, the West German governing coalition was so divided and so antagonistic to the Soviet Union in light of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20 August that action was “unlikely for the time being.”

  • February 17, 1969

    Telephone Conversation Transcript, Henry Kissinger and William P. Rogers

    The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty for ratification and its chairman, J. William Fulbright (D-Ark), wanted to know where Israel stood on the Treaty. Believing that the issue should be handled at the White House level, Rogers proposed a meeting with Kissinger, Laird, and CIA director Richard Helms. Agreeing to schedule a meeting, Kissinger acknowledged that the issue was also “political.”

  • March 13, 1969

    Rajya Sabha Q&A on the Reaction of Nuclear Powers to India's Refusal to Sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in its Present Form

    Transcript of questions and answers between members of the Rajya Sabha and the Minister of External Affairs, Shri Dinesh Singh, on the reaction of larger powers to India's attitude and refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in its present form.

  • March 29, 1969

    Memorandum from Ralph Earle, Office of International Security Affairs, 'Stopping the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the Middle East'

    This memo provided Laird with a scheme for a tough approach to Israel that involved a demarche to the Israeli government for “cease-and-desist” certain nuclear and missile [excised] activities and a demand for private assurances and, ultimately, Israel’s signature on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). To seal such a deal Earle proposed an exchange of letters between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir, for which he provided drafts.

  • April 30, 1969

    Thomas Hughes, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State, 'FRG - Further Delay on NPT Signature,' Intelligence Note-327

    Noting that the same objections to the NPT remained, INR opined that some West German politicians were using them “to rationalize an opposition that is really based on nationalistic emotions and on the political advantages to be derived from playing upon these emotions.”

  • May 30, 1969

    John P. Walsh, State Department Executive Secretary to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 'Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program—NSSM 40'

    This may well be the only formal written interagency response to NSSM 40.The State Department and the Defense Department agreed that Israel should sign the NPT and provide assurances not to produce nuclear weapons, but they disagreed on what should be done to get there.

  • July 14, 1969

    Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense, 'Israeli Nuclear Program,' with 'Scenario for Discussions with Israelis on their Nuclear Program, and NSSM 40'

    Packard's plan detailed in this memorandum and its attachments allegedly represented a consensus of the Defense leadership, Kissinger, Richardson, and Helms. Using a tough approach, the memorandum's enclosed plan focused on getting Israelis assurances and signature on the NPTs.

  • July 19, 1969

    Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Israeli Nuclear Program'

    The memorandum lays out substantive and significant line of thinking about the complex problem raised by the Israeli nuclear program. Kissinger thought it might be possible to persuade the Israelis that with all of the NPT’s loopholes signing it would not prevent them from continuing their weapons research and development. Kissinger also recognized the real possibility that the Israeli development momentum could not be stopped.

  • November 05, 1969

    Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Ambassador Helmut Roth, 'US-FRG Consultations on NPT,' with memorandum attached

    During these consultations on the NPT, the chief West German official, Helmut Roth, Chief of the Foreign Office’s Disarmament Section, reviewed the progress of the talks with Secretary of State Rogers. Roth emphasized the importance of the “reaffirmation” of US security commitments “at a time when [the Federal Republic] was signing a renunciation of nuclear weapons for its own defense.”

  • November 12, 1969

    Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    The Hungarian Ambassador in the DPRK discusses with Soviet officials Soviet-DPRK relations and Korea's stance on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

  • November 26, 1969

    US Embassy Bonn Telegram 15293, 'NPT – Text of FRG Note on NPT Signature'

    This telegram detailed the conditions under which the West German's would ratify the NPT, which depended on the results of EURATOM-IAEA safeguards negotiations.

  • November 28, 1969

    State Department Telegram 199360 to US Embassy Bonn, 'FRG and Swiss NPT Signatures'

    On 28 November 1969, West German Ambassador to the United States Rolf Pauls signed the NPT at the State Department and delivered a statement and a detailed note. At the signing Secretary Rogers spoke about the treaty’s value, the “historic” importance of the West German signature, the U.S. understanding that the UN Charter “confers no right to intervene by force unilaterally in the Federal Republic of Germany,” and a reaffirmation of U.S. security guarantees to NATO and the Federal Republic.

  • April, 1971

    Telegram from V.G. Joshi, 'Brief on Disarmament and Atomic-Free Zones for the Spring Meetings of the IPU to be held during April, 1971'

    Summary of history of negotiations of disarmament and nuclear-free zones.

  • September 20, 1971

    Note to the Executive Management of Foreign Affairs on Euratom Verification Agreement

    This document includes council directives to the Commission for the negotiation of a Euratom verification agreement in accordance with Article III, 4, of the NPT.

  • November 19, 1971

    South African Nuclear Fuel Agreement

    U.S. State Department memorandum weighing the arguments for and against renewing the agreement to sell uranium enrichment services to South Africa. The political fallout from engaging with the South African apartheid regime coupled with the fact that they had not signed the NPT were closely considered.

  • April 02, 1974

    Memorandum, Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, Information for the President of Brazil, 'Uranium Enrichment'

    Confidential report identifying major trends regarding uranium supply. The document assesses US capacity to supply nuclear fuel after 1980, and describes European initiatives to manage the fuel cycle. The document underscores the convenience of defining guidelines, which “might ensure Brazilian leadership in Latin America” (p.105); then, it outlines the difficulties inherent to the establishment of a bilateral agreement with the US (taking into account the Brazilian position vis-à-vis the NPT), and suggests Europe (most notably West Germany) as a potential partner. The document recommends the establishment of a confidential working group formed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Mines and Energy in order to set up a strategy that would allow for the establishment of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the partner country, at the time still undefined.

  • May 23, 1974

    Telegram No. 113, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Five days after India's first nuclear test, the Hungarian Embassy in New Delhi reports that Indian foreign policy experts speculate that the test could lead to closer Indian-Soviet relations.

  • May 23, 1974

    Telegram No. 118, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Five days after India's 1974 nuclear test, the Hungarian Embassy in New Delhi reports that the Indian government was grateful that the socialist countries had not confronted India on its nuclear explosion.