Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • July 23, 1986

    State Department Cable 229696 to US Embassy France et al., 'Visit of Pakistani Primin Mohammad Khan Junejo to Washington – 15-18 July 1986'

    A State Department Cable detailing the visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo to Washington D.C. According to administration officials, Junejo was “astute and well briefed” and professed to be responsive to the U.S. emphasis on the “absolute criticality” of “restraint” in Pakistani nuclear activities. In meetings with the press, Junejo “specifically affirmed” commitment not to enrich uranium above the five percent level.

  • April 09, 1987

    Fred McGoldrick to John Negroponte, 'Pakistan,' 9 April 1987, Secret, enclosing memo from Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, 'Action Plan on Pakistan Nuclear And Security Problems,' to Secretary of State

    A cable detailing a possible plan of action regarding Pakistani nuclear and security concerns. The document includes a brief background on the situation and a three phased strategy with responses on the international stage, the establishment of a Presidential emissary and a “game plan” for Capitol Hill.

  • July 14, 1987

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 'Your Meeting with Ambassador Merker'

    When ACDA director Kenneth Adelman saw the State Department talking points for a conversation with Pakistani ambassador Jamsheed Marker about the Pervez case he was irritated by the “business-as-usual” tone.

  • July 14, 1987

    State Department Telegram 215122 to Embassy Islamabad, 'Maraging Steel Case: Press Guidance'

    The Pervez arrest immediately raised questions in the media but the State Department would say little other than: let the legal system do its work, no speculation about Pervez’s intentions, and the admission that the Department had expressed concern to Pakistan about the “overall nature and direction of [its] nuclear program.”

  • July 15, 1987

    Department of State, Memorandum from Ted Borek to Mr. Peck [et al.], 'Letter to Justice on Pakistan Export Case'

    This draft of a State Department letter to the Justice Department, that was presumably sent soon thereafter, supported prosecution of Pervez to the “fullest extent of the law.”

  • July 16, 1987

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Norman Wulf, Director to the Director, 'Solarz Amendment Applicability to the Pakistani Procurement Case'

    ACDA official Norman Wulf saw a good case, with the information supporting positive answers to basic questions: would the maraging steel to be used for nuclear weapons manufacture, was the Pakistani national working on behalf of his government, would the steel “contribute significantly” to a capability to manufacture a nuclear explosive, and was there an “attempted illegal export”?

  • July 20, 1987

    Department of State, Memorandum from Ted Borek to Mr. Peck [et al.], 'Solarz Amendment: Legal Memorandum for Mr. Armacost'

    The Pervez case immediately raised questions among State Department lawyers about the relevance of the Solarz amendment. A final answer depended on more evidence; the lawyers wanted to see the many documents that Canadian authorities had impounded as well as the tape recordings of Pervez’s conversations with U.S. undercover agents.

  • July 23, 1987

    US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman for the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 'The Pakistani Procurement Cases'

    With Pakistan already violating the “red line” on uranium enrichment, Adelman believed that without a display of resolve “presidential credibility” would be further damaged; that required cutting off aid under the Solarz amendment.

  • July 24, 1987

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Briefing Memorandum from Anthony Salvia to the Director, 'HFAC Asia Subcommittee Hearing on Pakistan'

    A hearing by the House subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade on 22 July 1987 made it clear why administration officials worried about the implications of the Pervez case. With Congressman Solarz arguing that the arrest involved “a flagrant and provocative challenge to US nonproliferation objectives.”

  • July 26, 1987

    Department of State, 'Classified Congressional Briefing on Pakistani Clandestine Nuclear-Related Procurement'

    These are the State Department’s talking points for use with Congress. While ACDA officials were fairly certain that a violation of the Solarz amendment had occurred, the State Department did not want to assume anything until it had reviewed the evidence.

  • July 28, 1987

    Department of State, Draft Telegram to Embassy Athens [et al.], 'Pakistani Circumvention of Nuclear Export Controls'

    This telegram included information that US embassies were to share with foreign governments to help them tighten up their export controls of steel tubes.

  • July 28, 1987

    US District Court, 'Indictment: US of America Vs. Arshad Pervez and Inam Ul-Haq'

    The indictment against Pervez and Ul-Haq included charges of conspiracy, bribery, racketeering, export violations, and false statements.

  • July 30, 1987

    Embassy Islamabad telegram 16052 to Department of State, 'Pervez Nuclear Arrest Case—July 23 Statement by MFA Spokesman Gives Greater Emphasis to Conspiracy'

    Only a few weeks after Pervez’s arrest, Under Secretary of State Armacost traveled to Pakistan for wide ranging discussions with General Zia, but with a special focus on nuclear procurement and the uranium enrichment program.

  • August, 1987

    Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Memo discussing India's nuclear ambitions and position in Asia, especially in relation to China and Pakistan.

  • August 03, 1987

    Embassy Islamabad Telegram 16294 to Department of State, 'First Day in Islamabad—August 2'

    Armacost reported to Secretary Shultz, “I emphasized the need for immediate practical steps to demonstrate to an aroused Congress and a skeptical administration that no further illegal procurement activities would take place and that we had verifiable assurances there would be no further enrichment of weapons-grade uranium.”

  • August 05, 1987

    Embassy Islamabad Telegram 16556 to Department of State, 'Under Secretary Armacost Meeting with Zia'

    Zia argued that Washington was trying to “get one Pakistani in order to hang the entire government.”

  • August 07, 1987

    Department of State Telegram 244270 to the Embassy in Islamabad, 'Under Secretary Armacost Meeting with Zia'

    Only a few weeks after Pervez’s arrest, Under Secretary of State Armacost traveled to Pakistan for wide ranging discussions with General Zia, but with a special focus on nuclear procurement and the uranium enrichment program.

  • August 10, 1987

    Arms Control And Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Norman Wulf to the Director, 'Recent Activities Related to the Pakistani Procurement Case'

    Norman Wulf reviewed plans for a “dialogue” with Pakistan to prevent illegal procurement in the United States and verification of the five percent enrichment commitment.

  • August 13, 1987

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Norman Wulf to the Director, 'Weekly Activities Report'

    Wulf reported to Adelman that the information telegram on the Pervez and other smuggling cases had gone out to the embassies (except for Soviet bloc) and had received a favorable response from nuclear-supplier states.

  • August 23, 1987

    Embassy Islamabad Telegram 17754 to the Secretary of State, 'Pervez Case-GOP Regulation on Procurement Activities'

    During the Armacost-Zia talks, the Pakistanis tell US officials that they will confidentially share any new procurement regulations with them.