Bhutto shares with Zhou the results of Ayub Khan's visit to the Soviet Union. He also discusses the problems that the Sino-Soviet split has created for Pakistan, Soviet military aid to India, and the Vietnam War.

Only months after China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, INR looked into whether Beijing would help other nations get the bomb.

This transcript of conversations that occurred during the reception of I K. Zhegalin by Nicolae Ceausescu discusses the letters between the CPSU C.C. and the C.C. of the Chinese C.P. on the situation in Vietnam (Democratic Republic) and the Soviet Union's plans to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Germany's surrender.

During the conversation, it is said that the United States is increasing its attacks and overall involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Additionally, Soviet Ambassador Shcherbakov tells Pham Van Dong how the Chinese continue to evade giving aid to Vietnam because they fear attack from the Americans.

Chinese officials decide not to lend "original evidence" of the Soviet Union's subversive activities to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry weighs in on whether or not Xinjiang should hold an anti-Soviet exhibit during the 15th anniversary celebrations of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Burmese Foreign Minister U Thi Han stated that Burma had not been aware of India's proposal on forming an Asian-African armed forces, but Burma would champion justice and see through India's scheming.

On May 10, Chinese military officials confirm that they are prepared to detonate an aerial nuclear explosion but, due to unfavorable weather conditions, must postpone the test until May 12 or 13.

Zhou Enlai informs Mao Zedong that favorable weather conditions will allow them to carry out the aerial nuclear test explosion. An official statement for the press has also been prepared.

Zhou Enlai and Nguyen Minh Phuong discuss the possibility of convening an international conference on Cambodia.

Soviet Ambassador Ilya Shcherbakov informs a meeting of Socialist Ambassadors of Soviet-Vietnamese talks in Moscow. He notes that the United States realizes it does not have the international support for Vietnam that it had expected, and that the Soviet Union will continue to support Vietnam in the struggle. He argues that there is still much anti-Soviet propaganda in Vietnam, which comes from the Chinese, and points out three positions of the Chinese that he does not understand.

The Chinese Embassy in Bulgaria reports how representatives from throughout the socialist bloc in Bulgaria responded to China's second nuclear test.

The Chinese Embassy in Moscow reports reactions from students and military personnel in the USSR to China's second nuclear test.

Zhou Enlai addresses Nguyen Van Hieu and Nguyen Thi Binh concerning the steps to take should the US escalate in Vietnam and expand into China, comparing Vietnam to Korea.

The Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang reports the enthusiastic responses of North Koreans to China's second nuclear test.

The Chinese Embassy in Poland assesses the responses to the Chinese nuclear test among socialist countries in Eastern Europe.

The Mayor of Nagasaki expresses regret over China's second nuclear test.

A description of the Korean Workers' Party involvement in economic and company affairs.

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan describes different responses of Pakistani government officials and foreign government diplomats in Pakistan regarding China's first nuclear weapons test.

Speech on China's state of preparations for war with the United States.